Sam Curry and collaborators’ 2023 report, “16 Car Makers and Their Vehicles Hacked via Telematics, APIs, Infrastructure,” described separate vulnerabilities affecting systems associated with 16 automaker brands—not one universal exploit. Researchers reported access to connected-car commands, locations, customer data, accounts, dealer portals, cloud services, and fleet platforms, but the findings did not show remote control of steering or brakes.
The named brands were Acura, BMW, Ferrari, Ford, Genesis, Honda, Hyundai, Infiniti, Jaguar, Kia, Land Rover, Mercedes-Benz, Nissan, Porsche, Rolls-Royce, and Toyota. The central lesson is broader than the brand list: a connected vehicle’s security boundary includes the customer account, mobile app, web API, telematics provider, cloud service, dealer system, and fleet platform that support the vehicle.
As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.
Key takeaways
- The January 2023 disclosure covered systems associated with 16 automaker brands, but it described many separate vulnerabilities rather than one universal exploit.
- Researchers reported connected-car capabilities including remote lock and unlock, engine start and stop, location retrieval, horn and light commands, camera access in the Kia case, and account or ownership-management changes.
- The reported attack surface often consisted of customer accounts, dealer portals, APIs, SSO, cloud services, telematics providers, and fleet platforms rather than direct access to steering or brakes.
- According to Sam Curry and collaborators (2023), the Spireon research involved administrative access capable of affecting an estimated 15.5 million devices and approximately 1.2 million accounts.
- Automakers were notified and vendors released patches after the original disclosure, but later Kia and Toyota reporting showed that related web and API authorization weaknesses remained an important risk category.
Which 16 car makers were included?
The 16 automaker brands named in the research were Acura, BMW, Ferrari, Ford, Genesis, Honda, Hyundai, Infiniti, Jaguar, Kia, Land Rover, Mercedes-Benz, Nissan, Porsche, Rolls-Royce, and Toyota. The research examined connected services during 2022, and the primary disclosure was published in January 2023 by a group of seven security researchers. The findings applied to particular portals, APIs, accounts, suppliers, or infrastructure supporting vehicles from those brands—not automatically to every model, production year, market, or vehicle owned by each brand.
The Tool Desk
Outbyte PC Repair FREERepair Windows errors before they cause bigger problemsFix Now →Outbyte Driver Updater FREEScan for outdated or missing drivers - takes under a minuteDriver Scan →SecurityWeek’s January 5, 2023 report and the researchers’ original disclosure describe the cases in different levels of technical detail. The comparison below summarizes the reported entry points and capabilities without treating separate findings as one combined breach.
#1 Best Overall
- Never Let a Dead Battery Ruin Your Drive. The LISEN 4 in 1 Retractable Car Charger delivers reliable power for your entire journey. Compatible with standard 12V cigarette lighter sockets, it keeps phones, tablets, and devices charged during daily commutes, road trips, and long drives — the perfect practical gift for dads, truck drivers, and anyone who lives on the road.
- Daily Driver Essential: Always Ready When You Need It. Featuring two retractable cables ( USB C & Old iPhone Charging Cable ) that extend up to 31.5 inches and dual USB ports, this charger solves cable clutter while charging up to 4 devices simultaneously. Ideal for busy fathers, commuters, and families who want a tidy car and never worry about low battery again.
- Deliver full-speed PD fast charging for iPhone 18 Pro Max & iPhone 18 Pro Max & iPhone 18 Pro right inside your car. The built-in 45W PD USB-C port hits the peak charging speed for these latest iPhone models, juicing up your phone to 50% power in just 15 minutes while you drive.(Note: Maximum 45W PD output is available under 24V vehicle power supply. When used with standard 12V car sockets, the peak output is limited to 36W.)
- Standard 12V Power Solution: Designed as a dedicated USB power supply for charging devices. Note: Does NOT support CarPlay, Bluetooth, or data transfer. Compatible with most phones, tablets, and small electronics. This retractable charger is a core car organization tool, keeping your vehicle tidy. Not compatible with Micro-USB devices.
- Clutter-Free Tech Organization: Featuring dual USB ports and retractable cables, the LISEN 4 in 1 charger provides a clean car storage solution. Perfect for truck enthusiasts or as a thoughtful gift for drivers, it supports fast USB-C charging for devices like the iPhone 18Pro & iPhone 18 ProMax. Keep your vehicle organized while ensuring efficient power delivery for all your tech on the road.
| Brand | Reported entry point | Reported precondition | Vehicle or system capability | Reported data or access impact |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Acura | Customer-facing portal and telematics API | VIN in the reported case | Lock, unlock, engine start or stop, location, horn, and lights | PII, account takeover, and ownership or management-access changes |
| BMW | SSO, employee applications, and dealer portals | SSO weakness | Dealer and internal application access; VIN lookups | Employee applications and BMW sales documents |
| Ferrari | Customer account, CMS, and backend connectors | Zero-interaction account-takeover path as reported | Administrative-user manipulation and CMS access | Customer records and backend connector credentials |
| Ford | Production vehicle-telematics API and customer accounts | Exposed API path or separate account-takeover weakness | Access to vehicle-command tokens | PII, internal service credentials, and customer-account authentication |
| Genesis | Customer account and connected-vehicle API | Victim’s email address in the reported case | Remote vehicle commands | Account takeover |
| Honda | Customer-facing portal and telematics API | VIN in the reported case | Lock, unlock, engine start or stop, location, horn, and lights | PII, account takeover, and ownership or management-access changes |
| Hyundai | Customer account and connected-vehicle API | Victim’s email address in the reported case | Remote vehicle commands | Account takeover |
| Infiniti | Customer-facing portal and telematics API | VIN in the reported case | Lock, unlock, engine start or stop, location, horn, and lights | PII, account takeover, and ownership or management-access changes |
| Jaguar | Connected-account systems | Account-level weakness | No specific remote vehicle command is identified in the research summary | Password hashes, names, phone numbers, addresses, and vehicle information |
| Kia | Customer portal and telematics API | VIN in the original case | Lock, unlock, engine start or stop, location, horn, lights, and access to a 360-degree camera or live images | PII, account takeover, and ownership or management-access changes |
| Land Rover | Connected-account systems | Account-level weakness | No specific remote vehicle command is identified in the research summary | Password hashes, names, phone numbers, addresses, and vehicle information |
| Mercedes-Benz | Misconfigured SSO connected to internal applications and vehicle-related APIs | SSO weakness | Access to vehicle-related APIs and reported remote-code-execution paths | Internal applications, source and deployment systems, and PII |
| Nissan | Customer-facing portal and telematics API | VIN in the reported case | Lock, unlock, engine start or stop, location, horn, and lights | PII, account takeover, and ownership or management-access changes |
| Porsche | Telematics service | Telematics-service vulnerability; the summary does not specify one universal identifier | Vehicle location and vehicle commands | Customer information |
| Rolls-Royce | SSO, employee applications, and dealer portals | SSO weakness | Dealer and internal application access; VIN lookups | Employee applications and dealer-portal information |
| Toyota | Toyota Financial and, in later reporting, a connected-features portal | IDOR in Toyota Financial; later portal issue involved a leaked dealer credential | The original case concerned financial records; later reporting described location and connected-vehicle functions | Names, phone numbers, email addresses, loan status, and later connected-account exposure |
The table is a map of reported vulnerability classes, not a list of currently vulnerable vehicles. The original disclosures do not provide a uniform CVE-style record identifying every affected model, vehicle generation, production year, geography, or final patch version.
What is automotive telematics security?
Automotive telematics security is the protection of the vehicle, cellular-connected telematics module, mobile and web applications, backend APIs, identity systems, cloud services, and data used to provide connected-car features.
A connected vehicle’s security boundary extends beyond the vehicle itself. A typical connected feature can pass through an authenticated customer or dealer account, a web or mobile application, a backend API, a cellular network, a telematics control unit, and an in-vehicle command system. A weakness anywhere in that chain can expose a capability that the vehicle manufacturer intended to restrict.
Do these 3 things before closing this tab:
1Scan for outdated or missing drivers - takes under a minute2Repair Windows errors before they cause bigger problems3Fix the driver behind crashes, sound loss and screen glitchesThe researchers’ findings illustrate why a secure ECU or immobilizer is not enough by itself. A properly protected physical vehicle can still have privacy, account, fleet, or connected-feature problems if a web portal accepts another customer’s identifier, a dealer role has excessive privileges, or cloud credentials are exposed.
“If an attacker were able to find vulnerabilities in the API endpoints that vehicle telematics systems used, they could honk the horn, flash the lights, remotely track, lock/unlock, and start/stop vehicles, completely remotely.”
— Sam Curry, security researcher, 2023, in the original researcher disclosure
Can hackers start a car remotely?
Yes, researchers reported remote engine-start and engine-stop capabilities in several connected-vehicle cases, but the capability depended on a particular automaker service, account or identifier, vehicle configuration, and vulnerable backend path.
Quick wins for a faster PC:
Scan for outdated or missing drivers - takes under a minuteDriver Scan →Repair Windows errors before they cause bigger problemsFix Now →Remote engine start is not the same as remote driving. The 2023 findings primarily involved connected features, telematics commands, accounts, customer data, and supporting infrastructure. The research does not establish that attackers could steer vehicles or operate their brakes in these 16 cases.
Possible consequences varied by vehicle and service. A command to unlock a vehicle could create a theft opportunity; location access could create stalking and privacy risks; horn and light commands could cause disruption; and account or ownership reassignment could prevent the legitimate customer from managing the vehicle. Those are potential consequences of the reported capabilities, not evidence that a mass theft, crash, or widespread in-the-wild vehicle takeover occurred.
Rank #2
- High Quality Material: The coaster is made of environmentally friendly silicone, safe, non-toxic and odorless. Soft with toughness, easily embedded in the cup holder. Very durable, wear-resistant, long service life. High temperature resistance, can withstand 100 ℃ high temperature water cups.
- Wide Compatibility: The coaster has a diameter of 3.15 inches and a height of 1.18 inches, which is widely used in most vehicles, such as SUV, sedan, MPV, etc., as long as the size fits your car cup holder.
- Protection Function: Our car cup holder coaster has a carry handle design and a stand-up ring edge on its edge to effectively prevent food crumbs, drinks and water from leaking out and preventing the car cup holder from getting dirty.Meanwhile,Thickened design effectively prevents the cup holder from being scratched by the cup when driving on bumpy roads and eliminates the annoying thumping sound, making your journey more enjoyable.
- Easy to Use and Clean: With embedded installation, you just need to put it flat on the car cupholder. It is also very quick to remove, there is a small bump on the coaster, pinch it and you can easily remove the coaster. It is very easy to clean, rinse with water or wipe with a wet towel (be careful not to clean with sharp tools).
- 100% Satisfaction: Our products have quality assurance, if you have questions or are not satisfied after receiving the product, don't worry, please contact us as soon as possible, we provide after-sales service.
Can someone unlock a car with the VIN?
A VIN is not a universal key that automatically unlocks every connected car, but the researchers reported cases where a VIN served as the identifier needed to reach vulnerable vehicle commands through an automaker’s web service or API.
Acura, Honda, Infiniti, Nissan, and the original Kia case were described as allowing a range of commands using a VIN. Hyundai and Genesis were described as using the victim’s email address instead. The difference shows why the identifier and the authorization check matter: a portal should verify that the requesting account is entitled to control the specific vehicle, rather than treating a submitted VIN or email address as sufficient authority.
The later Kia investigation used a license plate to locate a vehicle record and then reported reassignment of connected-vehicle control. The Kia finding does not mean that anyone who knows a license plate can unlock any Kia; it means that a particular portal authorization flaw allowed the researchers to move from an identifier to connected-vehicle privileges. WIRED’s September 2024 investigation describes that later case.
How did the telematics API attack surface work?
The attack surface worked as a chain of trust: an account or dealer identity reached an application, the application called an API, the API authorized a vehicle or record, and the telematics system carried out the requested action.
- Identity: A customer, dealer, employee, fleet operator, or service account authenticated through a portal or SSO system.
- Application: A mobile app, web portal, dealer tool, or fleet-management interface sent requests to backend services.
- Authorization: The backend was supposed to verify that the account could access the requested vehicle, customer record, command, or administrative function.
- Telematics or cloud service: An authorized request reached a cellular-connected device, vehicle API, cloud database, or fleet platform.
- Outcome: Depending on the weakness, the request returned data, changed account ownership, issued a vehicle command, altered fleet configuration, or opened access to internal systems.
The recurring weaknesses were not interchangeable, but they often had the same root problem: the server trusted a client-controlled value, identity, credential, or role more than it should have.
| Weakness | What it means in this context | Potential result |
|---|---|---|
| Broken authorization or IDOR | The service identifies a record or vehicle but fails to confirm that the requester owns or administers it. | Another customer’s data, location, account, or vehicle functions become reachable. |
| Mass assignment | Client-submitted fields can change values that should be controlled only by the server. | Ownership, management status, privileges, or other protected attributes may be altered. |
| Weak account recovery or SSO | Password-reset flows or shared identity systems expose accounts, employee applications, dealer privileges, or internal tools. | Account takeover or movement from a customer-facing service into enterprise systems. |
| Exposed credentials and secrets | JavaScript bundles, cloud keys, API keys, or configuration files reveal authentication material or service routes. | Access to source code, cloud storage, internal services, customer data, or vehicle APIs. |
| Over-privileged dealer or fleet roles | A role created to manage many vehicles or customers has more authority than its job requires. | Large-scale vehicle tracking, fleet changes, customer-data exposure, or operational disruption. |
| Enterprise-infrastructure exposure | GitHub, Jenkins, SonarQube, cloud deployment tools, internal chat, and vehicle-related APIs share identity or trust relationships. | A portal weakness becomes a path into development, deployment, source-code, or production environments. |
ReversingLabs’ analysis of the connected-vehicle software supply chain explains why a vehicle service cannot be assessed only by inspecting the hardware inside the car. Third-party code, APIs, cloud storage, deployment systems, suppliers, and white-labeled services can all influence the practical security boundary.
What happened to the third-party telematics platforms?
Third-party platforms increased the possible blast radius because one supplier could serve vehicles, fleets, dealers, or other equipment for many customers and brands.
According to Sam Curry and collaborators (2023), researchers reported administrative access to Spireon systems capable of issuing arbitrary commands to an estimated 15.5 million devices and affecting approximately 1.2 million user accounts. The figures are the researchers’ estimates, not a count of confirmed compromised vehicles or accounts. The researcher disclosure said the platform covered mostly vehicles as well as tractors, golf carts, police cars, ambulances, trailers, and commercial fleets.
| Platform | Reported access or weakness | Reported capability or exposure | Important qualification |
|---|---|---|---|
| Spireon | Administrative access to fleet and device-management systems | Location retrieval, device-configuration changes, firmware updates, starter disabling on some devices, and fleet-management actions | Researchers reported that they could invite themselves to administer a U.S. police department’s fleet and track its vehicles, but they said they stopped testing rather than exercising every potentially dangerous function. |
| Reviver | Administrative access to connected digital-license-plate infrastructure | User-record exposure, vehicle tracking, plate-text changes, changing vehicle status to “STOLEN,” and fleet-management functions | The reported access concerned the cellular-connected and remotely managed plate platform, not a universal weakness in every vehicle. |
| SiriusXM Connected Vehicle Services | Leaked AWS keys with reported organizational read/write access to storage | Files that appeared to contain user databases, source code, and configuration files | Automakers did not necessarily use the service identically; some applications called a third-party API directly while others white-labeled it. |
The Spireon example is especially important because the researchers reported capability at the platform level, not merely access to one driver’s account. The report should not be read as proof that police, ambulance, or other emergency vehicles were actually disabled in the wild.
Rank #3
- ✅【Designed for Magsafe】 - The most fashionable iphone car mount in 2026 Magsafe is designed for iPhone 18 Pro Max/17/16/15/14/13/12 Pro Max Mini and official Magsafe cases and other magnetic phone cases and can be fixed directly to these phones without the need to affix metal plates. All Android Phones Will Work: Metal rings are provided; they fit cases and other phones without magsafe. Based on Unique Grandmaster Design (Protected by US Design Patent No. US D1,112,194 S)
- ✅【STRONG MAGNETIC MagSafe Car Mount】 - This powerful magnetic phone holder can create a powerful attraction that firmly supports your device while allowing you to drive without distraction. it easily and securely holds your phone through bumps, sharp turns or even sudden stops, no worrying of dropping your phone.
- ✅【SUPER STICK FORCE】 - VHB Dash Mounted Holders adhesive provides strong stick force between the dashboard and the car phone holder, which can firmly stick to any plane in the car, fix your device, adapt to a variety of road conditions such as sudden braking, speed bump, and rugged mountain road.
- ✅【SAFE DRIVING VIEW】 - Mini-size, not taking up space, it is placed in the dashboard without blocking the view at all, and does not need to look down at the device to ensure your safe driving. Cell Phone Car Mount is suitable for most cars, pickups, SUV, taxi; It is the best assistant for Uber and Lyft drivers
- ✅【360° FREE ROTATION】 - With an adjustable swivel ball joint, you can rotate your smartphone or device at your own will, providing the best viewing angle. Quickly pick and place with one hand, free your hands and make calls and GPS navigation more convenient
Did the researchers hack steering and brakes?
No evidence in the researched 16-brand disclosure establishes remote control of steering or brakes. The demonstrated and reported capabilities centered on telematics commands, connected features, account access, data, dealer systems, cloud infrastructure, and fleet management.
The distinction matters because the phrase vehicle hacked can describe several very different events. Reading a customer record, taking over a connected-service account, tracking a vehicle, unlocking doors, starting an engine, changing a digital plate, and reaching a development system all have different technical and safety implications. None should be casually rewritten as remote control of a moving vehicle.
The later Kia reporting made the limitation explicit: the web technique reportedly enabled tracking, unlocking, honking, and starting connected vehicles, but did not provide steering or brake access and did not itself defeat the immobilizer. WIRED’s account of the Kia follow-up documents that distinction.
Was this an active breach or one universal 2023 exploit?
No. The January 2023 story was a coordinated disclosure of separate vulnerabilities discovered during 2022, not evidence of one exploit that worked against every vehicle from all 16 brands.
The researchers reported vulnerabilities to the affected companies, and vendors released patches. SecurityWeek reported that vendors generally responded within one to two days, but the research does not provide a single patch version or a uniform final remediation record for every brand, model, market, and service. Readers should therefore avoid treating the article as either a current breach notice or a guarantee that every connected service is now secure.
No researched source establishes a confirmed mass vehicle takeover, crash, or widespread theft event caused by these findings. A reported capability, a demonstrated proof of concept, a potential impact, and an incident that occurred in the wild are different claims.
Why did later Kia and Toyota reports matter?
The later reports mattered because they showed that fixing individual findings did not eliminate the broader risk of weak web and API authorization.
In September 2024, WIRED reported that researchers found a Kia web-portal flaw that let them reassign connected-vehicle control from an owner’s account to their own account. The researchers used a license plate to locate a vehicle record and reported that they could track, unlock, honk, and start millions of connected Kia vehicles. Kia changed the portal after disclosure and said it was working on a permanent fix. The reported technique did not provide steering or brake control and did not itself defeat the immobilizer.
WIRED also reported a separate Toyota portal issue involving connected features and a leaked dealer credential. Toyota disabled the portal while accelerating security improvements. The Toyota follow-up should not be merged with the original Toyota Financial IDOR: the former involved connected-vehicle portal access, while the latter disclosed names, phone numbers, email addresses, and loan status.
What’s actually slowing this PC down?
Pick the symptom - the matching free tool is one click away.
Rank #4
- Buyer's Guide: The seat guard for car seat between seat & console measures 15.75*2.7*1.53", suitable for gaps of 1.43-1.53" in width, please double-check carefully the distance between your seat and the center console before placing an order
- Storage and Filling in One: Differ from traditional single-function gap fillers, gap filler for car incorporates storage function, offers you the convenience of storing phones and various other items, so that you can access them at any time while driving
- Avoid Items Slipping: With the bumps and vibrations of the car, phones, keys may fall into the seat crevices, which is difficult to pick up, and distracts the driver's attention. Car gap seat filler fills gaps seamlessly to create an effective barrier
- Easy to Install: Car side seat gap filler is easy to install, simply insert it into the gap between the seat and the center console, gap seat filler for car can fit tightly without affecting the normal adjustment of the seat and the use of the seat belt
- Premium Material: Crafted from premium EVA material, our car seat side gap filler boasts a combination of wear-resistant, softness&durability. Maintenance is effortless, simply rinse and wipe to quickly clean the dust and debris in corners and crevices
Independent reader supportYour contribution helps us test, update, and keep practical guides available for everyone.“Once you have these user features tied into the phone, this cloud-connected thing, you create all this attack surface you didn’t have to worry about before.”
— Stefan Savage, professor of computer science at the University of California, San Diego, quoted by WIRED in 2024
What should automakers and suppliers change?
Automakers and suppliers should secure the complete connected-vehicle lifecycle rather than treating the telematics module as the only security boundary.
- Inventory the ecosystem: Maintain an accurate inventory of vehicle software, telematics units, mobile applications, APIs, cloud services, suppliers, dealer tools, credentials, and update mechanisms.
- Enforce object-level authorization: Check server-side ownership and role permissions for every vehicle, customer record, command, and fleet action. A VIN, license plate, email address, or record ID should identify an object, not grant authority to control it.
- Reduce privileges: Separate customer, dealer, fleet, employee, developer, deployment, and administrator roles. Limit each role to the vehicles, records, commands, and environments it actually needs.
- Protect identity systems: Harden SSO, password recovery, session handling, service accounts, API tokens, and administrative login paths. Revoke exposed secrets and avoid allowing one identity compromise to reach unrelated internal tools.
- Secure suppliers and white-labeled services: Assess third-party APIs, cloud storage, source repositories, firmware services, digital-license-plate platforms, and fleet-management providers as part of the vehicle’s threat model.
- Monitor and rehearse response: Detect unusual account, API, fleet, and command activity; maintain the ability to revoke tokens, disable a portal, isolate a supplier, communicate with owners, and restore trusted software.
- Design for recovery: A secure system needs not only prevention but also cyber-resilient recovery when a credential, API, supplier, or cloud environment is compromised.
NHTSA’s September 7, 2022 Cybersecurity Best Practices for the Safety of Modern Vehicles is non-binding U.S. guidance. The guidance calls for risk-based protection of safety-critical systems, timely detection and response, cyber-resilient recovery, information sharing, supply-chain awareness, and maintained software inventories.
Recommended Free Tools
“As vehicle technology and connectivity develop, cybersecurity needs to be a top priority for every automaker, developer, and operator.”
— Dr. Steven Cliff, then NHTSA Administrator, September 7, 2022, in NHTSA’s cybersecurity guidance announcement
What is UNECE R155?
UNECE Regulation No. 155 is an international vehicle-cybersecurity framework that requires a Cyber Security Management System and cybersecurity processes for vehicles in jurisdictions applying the regulation.
| Framework | Status and geography | What it emphasizes | Why it relates to these findings |
|---|---|---|---|
| NHTSA Cybersecurity Best Practices | Non-binding U.S. guidance published in 2022 | Risk-based protection, detection, response, recovery, information sharing, supply-chain awareness, and software inventories | It treats cybersecurity as covering electronic systems, communications networks, control algorithms, software, users, and underlying data—not only safety-critical ECUs. |
| UNECE Regulation No. 155 | Mandatory for new vehicle types in the European Union from July 2022 and for all new vehicles produced there from July 2024, according to UNECE’s stated implementation timeline | Cyber Security Management Systems, current risk assessment, manufacturer processes, supplier relationships, monitoring, detection, and response | Its lifecycle and supply-chain approach addresses the identity, supplier, cloud, monitoring, and incident-response weaknesses exposed by connected-vehicle research. |
UNECE’s Regulation No. 155 page sets out the regulation and its Cyber Security Management System requirements. The UNECE implementation announcement describes the European Union dates. R155 does not mean that every connected vehicle everywhere has identical protections; it applies through the regulatory jurisdictions and approval processes that adopt it.
Crashes, No Sound, or Screen Glitches?
Random freezes, missing sound and display glitches usually trace back to one bad driver. Find and replace yours safely.Free scan · under a minutePC Slower Than It Used to Be?
A free scan shows the junk files, broken settings and background clutter dragging Windows down - then fixes them in one click.Free scan · Windows 10 & 11How can drivers protect a connected car?
Drivers cannot repair a vulnerable automaker API or telematics supplier themselves, but drivers can reduce account-takeover risk and make unauthorized access easier to detect.
Best Value
- 🔰 UPGRADED SIDE STORAGE DESIGN - Our console cover is thinner than the old one, universal for all seasons. There is an 8.66*5.12 inch storage pocket design on each left and right side, expanding the storage space, convenient and practical. Meet the storage needs of the main passenger seat, you can store your cell phone, keys, tissues, ID and some other small daily items.
- 🔰 PREMIUM MICROFIBER LEATHER MATERIAL - This car center console cover is made of quality microfiber leather material, soft and skin-friendly touch. Exquisite and fashionable diamond shaped stitching, every detail is in place. Inside the car center console cover is made of thickened memory foam, even after squeezing, it can slowly recover to its original shape.
- 🔰 RELIEVE DRIVING FATIGUE - The arm rest cover for car adopts ergonomic design, giving just the right amount of arm support, effectively dispersing elbow pressure and relieving driving fatigue. Protect your car's center console from getting dirty or scratched. Especially suitable for long time driving or long distance traveling, bringing you a new experience of relaxation and comfort!
- 🔰 NON-DESTRUCTIVE INSTALLATION - This car console cover is designed with an elastic band for a firm fit and not easy to shake. And the back side is full of protruding dots, which can effectively avoid the armrest cover from slipping and shifting. All you need to do is to open the center console cover, put the elastic band directly into the cover and then close it.
- 🔰 BUYER'S GUIDE - You will receive a car armrest storage box with the size of 12.13*7.80 inch, please measure the size of your car's armrest storage box before you buy. We have prepared five simple and beautiful colors for you, you can choose according to your own preferences. Suitable for most of the vehicles on the market, such as car, truck, SUV, RV, van, etc.
- Use a unique account password: Do not reuse the connected-car password on email, shopping, or other services. A reused password can turn an unrelated account leak into a vehicle-service problem.
- Enable multifactor authentication when offered: MFA helps protect the customer account, although MFA cannot fix a server-side authorization flaw or a compromised supplier.
- Install official app and vehicle updates: Keep the connected-car application and vehicle software on the versions supplied by the manufacturer, and follow manufacturer security notices.
- Remove old access: When buying or selling a used vehicle, remove the previous owner, dealer, family member, fleet, and third-party connected-service access that should no longer remain.
- Review account activity and vehicle permissions: Treat unexpected password resets, ownership changes, new users, vehicle-location alerts, or command notifications as possible account-security events.
- Contact the automaker promptly: Ask the manufacturer to revoke sessions and tokens, reset connected services, and investigate the vehicle account if unauthorized activity appears.
- Do not mistake a diagnostic scanner for a cloud-security control: An OBD-II scanner can support lawful diagnostics or a controlled educational lab, but it does not protect against weak SSO, leaked credentials, dealer portals, cloud APIs, telematics providers, or fleet infrastructure.
Owners should also avoid testing a suspected flaw against a vehicle or account that they do not own or administer. The safest response to a suspected connected-service vulnerability is responsible reporting to the automaker or provider, not experimenting with commands against another person’s vehicle.
What is a useful book for learning automotive security legally?
For readers who want the technical background, The Car Hacker’s Handbook by Craig Smith is an educational reference on automotive computer systems and embedded software. The publisher and official book resources cover vehicle buses, ECUs, wireless systems, key fobs, immobilizers, and penetration-testing concepts; Open Garages’ official book resource provides additional material.
The book is relevant because the 16 cases crossed APIs, identity systems, telematics, ECUs, and wireless-connected systems. The book is not a consumer security product, a patch for an automaker portal, or a guarantee that a connected car is safe. Any hands-on work should use owned equipment, an authorized lab, and responsible-disclosure practices.
Free tools Windows power users keep installed
One-click scans. No signup required.
Frequently Asked Questions
Were all vehicles from the 16 automaker brands vulnerable?
No. The 2023 disclosure described separate vulnerabilities affecting particular services, accounts, suppliers, and infrastructure. It did not establish that every model, production year, market, or vehicle from each of the 16 brands was vulnerable in the same way.
Did the researchers remotely control steering or brakes?
No. The research did not establish remote steering or brake control. Reported capabilities centered on connected commands such as lock, unlock, engine start or stop, location, horn, lights, camera access in the Kia case, accounts, data, and supporting infrastructure.
Does an OBD-II scanner protect a connected car from these attacks?
No. An OBD-II scanner may support lawful diagnostics or an authorized educational lab, but it cannot fix weak cloud authorization, SSO, leaked credentials, dealer portals, telematics APIs, or fleet-management infrastructure.
The Bottom Line
Bottom line: The 16-brand disclosure was a warning about connected-vehicle ecosystems, not proof that 16 automakers shared one exploit or that steering and brakes were remotely controlled. Customer portals, APIs, SSO, cloud services, telematics suppliers, and fleet systems can provide powerful access when authorization fails, so vehicle security must extend from the ECU to every account, supplier, and service that supports the car.
Quick Recap
Product prices and availability are accurate as of the date/time indicated and are subject to change. Any price and availability information displayed on Amazon at the time of purchase will apply.
